Remembrance of Crises Past by Hoffman, Philip T. & Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent
How did we get into this mess, and what should we be doing to prevent it from happening again? 
The past offers some lessons, say two economic historians.
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This poster 
for an 1895 
melodrama de-
picts a scene 
familiar to 
19th-century 
Americans—
the United 
States experi-
enced financial 
panics in 
1819, 1837, 
1857, 1873, 
and 1893. 
“The one-dollar bill is the most ubiquitous piece of paper in America,” writes currency collage artist Mark 
Wagner, who cuts up thousands of them to create pieces such as I.O.U. (left); his works are collected by 
dozens of institutions, including the Museum of Modern Art, the Walker Art Center, the Library of Congress, 
and the Smithsonian Institution. (Mark Wagner, I.O.U., 2008, currency collage on panel; 12 x 16 inches.)
By Philip T. Hoffman and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
thE Past as PRologuE
If we are to believe our financial lead-
ers, the current crisis is, as a stunned Alan 
Greenspan told Congress, a “once in a 
century credit tsunami”—difficult to antici-
pate and completely unlike anything in the 
past. Or as former secretary of the treasury 
Robert Rubin explained in an interview with 
the New York Times, “Clearly, there were 
things wrong. But I don’t know of anyone 
who foresaw a perfect storm, and that’s 
what we’ve had here.”
 What strikes economic historians, 
though, is just how much this crisis re-
sembles past financial collapses. Financial 
debacles often originate, as this one did, 
in a combination of an asset boom (in this 
case, rising housing prices) and a finan-
cial innovation (subprime mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities such as bonds). 
Investors add this innovation to their portfo-
lios, thus increasing its price by increasing 
the demand for it. The rapid price increase 
then convinces investors to buy more of the 
high-return and deceptively safe asset, and 
financial intermediaries strive to boost the 
supply. With swelling demand and supply, 
the quality of the asset soon begins to fall 
as the middlemen (the mortgage originators, 
asset brokers, and rating agencies) relax 
their standards for, say, creditworthiness. 
Meanwhile, investors borrow money to buy 
up even more of the new asset. At some 
point so much money is invested in dubious 
assets that the market inevitably breaks 
down, and if the collapse is large enough, 
the bad news cascades through the rest 
of the credit system and the economy as a 
whole. The beleaguered actors in the drama 
then rush for public assistance, saying, in 
effect, “Who knew?” 
In fact, everybody knew—or should have 
known. Financial crises have repeatedly 
dotted the history of the United States 
(and the world), and they show no signs of 
going away. The U.S. was struck by a crisis 
originating in the real-estate sector as early 
as 1837. Real-estate prices had been soar-
ing in the Midwest in the 1830s, and many 
states began bold plans to improve their 
road and canal systems. To fund these pub-
lic works, they borrowed heavily in England 
in anticipation of higher real-estate taxes. 
When farm prices fell in 1837, the market 
for land crashed and 11 states defaulted on 
their bonds. 
And a very close parallel to the current 
situation can be found in the mortgage crisis 
that battered the country in the 1890s. The 
origins of this crisis lay with the opening of 
the Great Plains to wheat farming. Settlers 
who wanted to improve or enlarge their 
farms could try to get credit from their local 
savings and loan associations, but these 
entities had limited funds. Furthermore, most 
households on the frontier were net bor-
rowers, making interest rates relatively high. 
Western mortgages were thus attractive 
investments for eastern capitalists, and they 
created companies that hired loan agents 
on the Great Plains to find borrowers and 
make mortgage loans. The capitalists then 
issued bonds in Europe that were backed 
by the mortgages. Problems arose when 
a drought hit, and farmers throughout the 
Plains defaulted on their loans. The East 
Coast and European investors suffered the 
most, because competition among the mort-
gage companies had led them to drop the 
requirement that loan agents carefully check 
on the value of the borrowers’ collateral. 
Rising real-estate prices, mortgage-backed 
securities, and competition leading to lax 
underwriting standards—sound familiar? 
Our current predicament began with the 
spread of the now-infamous adjustable 
subprime mortgages, more than half of 
which are now in arrears. These mortgages 
were repackaged with other, sounder ones 
and resold at high prices based on a math-
ematical model whose fundamental flaws 
we’ll discuss presently. Meanwhile, in the 
real world, decreasing or even eliminating 
the required down payment was allowing 
people with little savings (which frequently 
correlates with a shaky or nonexistent credit 
history) into the market. Consequently, more 
and more homes were being sold to buyers 
who could only meet their payments if hous-
ing values continued to rise while interest 
rates remained low. With benefit of hind-
sight it is clear that our real-estate boom 
depended on both home prices going up at 
least 10 percent per year for the foreseeable 
future, and nominal interest rates staying be-
low 5 percent. It does not take a genius to 
see that these two conditions were unlikely 
to continue to hold for long. The resulting 
crash, however, is particularly severe, be-
cause the underlying market—for residential 
housing—involves a very large share of 
all the wealth in the country, and because 
the associated credit market dwarfs all the 
others. At a towering 14 trillion dollars, it is 
one-third larger than the national debt and 
accounts for 44 percent of all the outstand-
ENGINEERING & SCIENCE   wi ntE R 2008   22
ing private credit in the United States. 
Similarly, in the 1930s, the Great Depres-
sion may have begun with a stock-market 
crash, but it wreaked such havoc in the 
housing and mortgage markets that the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC) and the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) were 
formed to ward off any future housing col-
lapses. Since then, it may seem that we have 
escaped crises in mortgage markets, but 
that is not the case. The savings-and-loan 
crisis of the late 1980s as well as severe 
regional housing downturns (including one in 
the 1990s in Southern California) serve as 
reminders that residential real estate may be 
the oldest asset market on the planet, but it 
still contains an important element of risk.
When they formulated the complex 
mathematical models that allowed them to 
price mortgage-backed securities, financial 
firms ignored this history. The models are 
based upon the fundamental observation 
that what really matters is the overall trend 
in the value of your portfolio, not how the 
price of a given asset changes. In other 
words, it doesn’t matter what each of your 
individual investments does—pork bellies 
may go up while soybean futures crash, but 
as long as the winners go up by more than 
the losers go down, you’ll be fine. The key 
is diversification—don’t put all your eggs 
in one basket, or all your money into pork 
bellies. In this case, the models presumed 
that since the bonds backed by subprime 
mortgages were really mostly backed by 
ordinary mortgages taken out by people 
with solid credit histories, the risk was suf-
ficiently diversified that the bonds deserved 
very high ratings—which the brokers heartily 
encouraged, because it made the prices go 
up even further. 
The only way to lose would be if every-
thing went south at the same time, a 
phenomenon called undiversifiable risk. So 
the key issue, then, was how to measure 
that undiversifiable risk. To do this, finan-
cial firms relied upon data series that are 
merely a couple of decades long, or at best 
stretching back to World War II. It was as if 
the past were irrelevant. In a crisis, though, 
that can be a fatal mistake. During a crisis, 
as we all know today, virtually all private 
assets move in the same direction—down. 
There are therefore moments of enormous 
undiversifiable risk, but they are rare, at most 
occurring once every quarter century.
It may seem foolhardy to estimate the 
likelihood of such low-frequency events from 
such a short history—it’s as if we only relied 
on the earthquake record of the Los Angeles 
basin over the last 25 years to calculate the 
likelihood of the Big One. But that is precise-
ly what financial firms did. The 1985–2005 
time series had another drawback as well: 
the housing boom began about when the 
dot-com bubble burst. The one acted as a 
cushion against the other, so homeowners 
who hadn’t seriously overinvested in dot-
coms didn’t suffer too badly. After 2003 the 
housing and stock markets rose together, 
which was further good news. But the short 
span of data did not contain instances when 
the two markets dropped in tandem, as they 
have done recently, and so the financial firms 
overlooked this possibility. 
Why were all the bright minds of Wall 
Street and all our financial regulators so 
blind to such a mistake? Once again, a look 
back provides an explanation. To begin with, 
Americans share a belief that technological 
change nullifies the past, and in particular 
makes the more distant past devoid of 
any useful lessons. Second, all of us who 
dabble in finance—even if only to save 
for retirement—yearn for investments that 
provide high returns without risk. Accept-
ing the lessons of the past (and of modern 
financial theory) would force us all to realize 
that such portfolios are about as feasible as 
perpetual-motion machines. Third, regula-
tors in the past few decades have faced 
tremendous political pressure not to inter-
vene in financial markets. The real-estate 
boom was extremely popular. Republicans 
appreciated the expansion of the mortgage 
market as an element in constructing the 
“ownership society.” Democrats promoted 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s purchase of 
securities based on low-income mortgages 
as a way to extend access to credit to less-
advantaged groups. Would-be homeowners 
favored relaxed lending standards because 
it allowed them to enter the housing market 
with less of a down payment. Those who 
were already homeowners gleefully reduced 
their retirement savings, since their houses 
were worth so much more. Not only that, 
they even practiced a kind of negative 
saving by using home-equity credit lines 
for big-ticket purchases, including fancy 
vacations—using their homes as ATMs, 
essentially. The construction industry could 
not but enjoy the fruits of high housing de-
mand, as did real-estate agents, mortgage 
brokers, and local governments, which rely 
on property taxes for much of their budgets. 
And of course, the financial industry found 
the boom highly profitable. A message like 
“the higher the rise, the harder the fall” was 
clearly not welcome, but that, unfortunately, 
was the only message history offered.
suRviving laRgE lossEs
For the past 12 months, our attention has 
been focused on attenuating the short-term 
Rising real-estate prices, mortgage-backed securities, 
and competition leading to lax underwriting standards—
sound familiar? 
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impact of the crisis. The U.S. and other 
governments have enacted large-scale 
stimulus packages, spent billions shoring 
up shaky balance sheets, and pledged bil-
lions more to reassure individuals that their 
bank deposits are safe. These acts have 
transformed the financial landscape. The 
few surviving large independent investment 
banks have morphed into bank holding 
companies in order to enjoy the benefits 
of backing by the Federal Reserve. In the 
commercial banking world, intervention to 
salvage institutions battered by large capital 
losses has created four truly national banks, 
which hold a shockingly large share of all 
deposits. Such concentration would have 
been unthinkable a mere decade ago, or 
even a few months ago. To be sure, the 
creation of large national banks is a good 
thing for many reasons, among which are 
that they can give consumers access to 
ATMs across the country, and that they take 
advantage of economies of scale in the 
information technologies that underpin the 
banking business today. Nonetheless, the 
absorption of Washington Mutual by J. P. 
Morgan Chase and of Wachovia by Wells 
Fargo was driven by expediency, rather than 
by careful planning for the long-term health 
of the American financial system. And as the 
recent near-collapse of Citigroup dem-
onstrates, even big banks can have huge 
problems if they are not properly supervised.
These structural changes will have 
consequences long after the flow of 
government money comes to a halt. What 
more—if anything—should be done? An 
understanding of the long-term evolution of 
financial markets suggests two fundamental 
rules that should guide further change: the 
mortgage problem must be addressed at 
the level of the homeowner, and partial regu-
lation is bad regulation.
The heart of the current financial crisis is 
that some homeowners cannot afford the 
payments they have contracted to make, 
while others find defaulting attractive be-
cause the value of their homes has dropped 
well below what they owe. As mortgage 
losses mount, banks have to reduce their 
ability to make new loans—most banks have 
requirements that limit their lending to some 
percentage of the firm’s capital. The decline 
in bank stocks has aggravated the problem, 
forcing banks to hold on to whatever income 
they earn simply to meet prudent balance-
sheet requirements. Given that banks have 
lost about 40 percent of their overall value, it 
is not surprising that credit has been tight.
One can imagine two solutions to this 
problem. First, if banks were forced to 
hold higher reserves to cover future losses 
on risky loans or on investments in exotic 
derivative contracts, future crises would be 
less severe, because banks would be bet-
ter prepared for them. Such a requirement 
would also make nonstandard investments 
more costly, because they would require 
idling more capital to cover any potential 
losses. Banks would therefore have less 
incentive to load up on risky bets. However, 
there is a problem—in a world of complicat-
ed asset portfolios, government regulators 
are at a very serious disadvantage in decid-
ing what a prudent reserve ought to be. If 
the regulators are too conservative, they 
will stifle innovation; if they are too lax, they 
invite crises. And in the absence of long 
historical data series for guidance, the task 
of creating portfolio rules may well smack of 
reading tea leaves. (One could, of course, 
hire armies of economic historians to put 
together the necessary data series, but that 
would take years.) 
The alternative, which we favor, is to focus 
directly on mortgages, and require that 
buyers make a minimum down payment and 
demonstrate that they have enough income 
to service their loan. Such requirements are 
not new, but they have never had the force 
of law. In the 19th century, it was standard 
to limit mortgages to half the value of the 
property. With such a high down payment, 
an income requirement was unimportant. 
When the last real-estate bubble burst in 
Los Angeles in the 1990s, it was difficult 
to get a loan with less than a 20 percent 
down payment. Whether the minimum 
down payment now should be 20, 15, or 10 
percent is something that can be debated. 
If we choose to impose low down pay-
ments, we should tack on income verifica-
tion standards, as is done with conventional 
mortgages. We should also make sure 
that homeowners cannot take out home 
equity loans that would push them beyond 
a prudent loan-to-value ratio. A higher down 
payment requirement will, of course, freeze 
some people out of the market and thus 
reduce the demand for owner-occupied 
housing, particularly expensive housing. 
But it will also cut the likelihood of crises, 
by insulating the financial system from 
defaults triggered by small price declines. 
In any case, it is clear that loans with no 
down payment are recipes for disaster. With 
down-payment and income-verification rules 
in place, homeowners might be putting in 
fewer granite countertops, but they wouldn’t 
be fretting about their pensions.
Rules about income and down payments 
are easy to write, and easy to enforce. Our 
long-standing, county-level mortgage-
registration system already keeps track of 
all loans backed by a particular piece of 
real estate, and we have adequate, if not 
perfect, means of assessing both housing 
values and income. Of course, the real-
estate and banking sectors may not like 
having such rules imposed by legislation. 
They may argue that they are moving in this 
This 1910 cartoon by Frank A. 
Nankivell for Puck magazine 
shows John Pierpont Morgan with 
his right arm encircling New York 
City’s financial district while his 
left reaches for a child’s piggy 
bank. The caption across the bot-
tom reads, “The Central Bank—
Why should Uncle Sam establish 
one, when Uncle Pierpont is 
already on the job?” 
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direction on their own. But one should bear 
in mind that industry standards of this sort 
tend to disappear in boom times, leading 
inexorably to the next crisis. Now is the time 
to implement such safeguards legislatively, 
while the chastened banking and real-estate 
industries’ traditional opposition to public 
regulation is stilled by their desperate need 
for government largesse.
PaRtial REgulation is Bad REgula-
tion
More broadly, the Federal Reserve should 
be given authority over all financial actors—
not just commercial banks, and not just big 
entities, but all financial firms. Currently the 
Fed has a very specific set of mandates 
that give it clear authority over commercial 
banks, but little formal power over invest-
ment banks or insurance companies, and no 
hold at all over hedge funds. While its pow-
ers over investment banks and insurance 
companies have expanded in the current 
crisis, the financial sector has balked at giv-
ing it authority over hedge funds. 
The Fed’s shackles have historical roots. 
The Federal Reserve system was created 
in response to the Panic of 1907, when 
the discovery of stock-market shenanigans 
led to runs on many commercial banks. 
The United States had no central bank, 
so a group of private financiers led by J. P. 
Morgan wound up pledging tens of millions 
of dollars of their own money to stabilize the 
system. Yet even after this crisis the idea of 
a central bank was regarded with deep sus-
picion in many quarters, so in a compromise 
the Federal Reserve was created to monitor 
and provide liquidity to commercial banks 
across the U.S., while ignoring investment 
banks and allowing states to maintain their 
authority over other businesses, such as 
savings and loans and insurance compa-
nies. 
Although the Federal Reserve’s role has 
grown in recent decades, as banks have 
become truly national for the first time in 
our history, its purview is still limited by 
other federal agencies such as the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
its ability to regulate many financial actors 
remains at best indirect. Since it has no 
authority over hedge funds or insurance 
companies, in theory it has no obligation to 
help them out when they get into trouble. 
The founding philosophy was that if such a 
firm should fail, tough luck—that’s the inves-
tors’ problem. However, the current crisis 
has taught us that we don’t believe in tough 
luck. The argument will no doubt be made 
that giving the Fed such oversight will stifle 
innovation, and it may well be true that inno-
vation in financial markets might be slowed 
by more stringent regulation. On the other 
hand, for political and practical reasons the 
Fed cannot let big firms that are indepen-
dent of its authority fail. Implicitly, these firms 
are getting the benefits of possible Fed 
assistance in the future. That can make them 
take undue risks, leaving taxpayers with the 
bill. They therefore have to submit to regula-
tion by the Fed.
Leaving aside the political pressures that 
can be exerted to have the Fed save a huge 
hedge fund such as Long Term Capital Man-
agement, or an insurance company such 
as AIG, there are also practical reasons for 
allowing the Fed to take on such rescue 
operations. The first is that these institutions 
are enmeshed in a web of contracts with the 
firms that the Fed regulates. As the failure 
of Lehman Brothers shows, the collapse of 
one of these firms can have dramatic effects 
on the rest of the financial system; letting  
AIG fail would have led to even worse 
consequences. The problem is not simply 
that some firms are too big to fail. Rather, it 
is that if any segment of the financial market 
gets out of control, it can send shock waves 
throughout the system, even when the firms 
in crisis are small. The subprime mortgage 
market, after all, was only about 10 percent 
of the value of all mortgages and only 20 
percent of the new mortgages in 2006, 
but its demise has triggered real estate’s 
worse crisis in 80 years. Thus no big firm 
can stand outside the Fed’s purview, and no 
large segment of the financial market can 
escape its authority. 
If we do let one part of the market escape 
the Fed’s regulation, all sorts of problems 
can arise. Consider how banks reacted to 
competition from unregulated hedge funds. 
As the hedge funds racked up large returns 
with their new financial techniques, tradition-
al banks faced a drain of clients and talent 
that migrated to the innovators. The banks 
lobbied for some mechanism that would 
stanch the flow, and a solution was found by 
allowing them to hold much of their high-risk 
activities in Special Investment Vehicles, es-
sentially dummy corporations, so as to keep 
them off their books—and thus outside the 
scope of regulators, and beyond the ken of 
most investors. When the subprime problem 
surfaced, some of the banks had to bring 
this activity back onto their balance sheets, 
shocking investors with huge losses. Had 
the playing field been level, no such sleight 
of hand would have occurred.
it’s haRd to MakE PREdictions,  
EsPEcially aBout thE FutuRE 
Requiring down payments on mortgages 
and giving the Federal Reserve authority 
over the entire financial system will reduce 
the damage crises do, but these two mea-
sures will not eliminate crises altogether. 
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Hoffman (left) and 
Rosenthal (right).
Financial markets have the very difficult task 
of directing resources towards high-return 
investments while diversifying risk. With-
out a crystal ball, investors have to guess 
about the future, and sometimes they will be 
wrong. 
Nevertheless, our two rules should be 
adopted now, for we know that this will not 
be the last crisis to hit, and for the moment 
we have a coalition that is eager for reform. 
Now is the time to design financial markets 
to be robust—not just in regard to the his-
tory of the last couple of decades, but to a 
very broad set of events. We should assess 
risks not just with short sets of recent data 
but with evidence from the past. 
These difficult times are also ushering in 
complex transformations in our households 
and in our international relationships. The 
days when Americans could believe that 
long-run prosperity was compatible with 
a personal savings rate near zero are now 
over. From the mid-1980s to the present, 
we enjoyed unprecedented run-ups in stock 
prices, and then in housing values, that cre-
ated personal wealth with little or no effort 
on our part. We should not expect such 
good luck in the future. Given the increas-
ingly large fraction of the population that is 
elderly, an increase in Social Security ben-
efits is unlikely. If Americans want to retire 
comfortably, they will have to save.
In part because this is an election year, 
the crisis has been managed largely as a 
domestic problem. However, it is interna-
tional, and will continue to affect the whole 
world. A latent fuel to the credit boom that 
moved us to this crisis was the world’s 
willingness to lend us money, including the 
billions of dollars that China had amassed 
in foreign-exchange reserves and the large 
stakes that many foreign banks had taken in 
our mortgage market. While increasing our 
savings rates may wean us from a habit of 
foreign borrowing that is even more danger-
ous than our dependence on foreign oil, it 
will not change the fact that the financial 
market is global. Venice, Paris, and London 
have all been the centers of the financial 
world, only to be supplanted after various 
crises rocked them. If we want New York to 
remain the world’s preeminent financial cen-
ter, we must insure that our financial house 
is in order.
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